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Constitutional Cases 2007:  
An Overview 
Patrick J. Monahan and James Gotowiec* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 11th Annual Constitutional 
Cases Conference held on April 18, 2008, examines the constitutional 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the calendar year 
2007.1 The Court handed down just 58 judgments in 2007,2 the lowest 
number since the Court’s “modern era” began in 1975.3 Before 2007, the 
McLachlin Court heard an average of 82 appeals per year, while the 
Lamer Court heard an average of 111 appeals every year. Constitutional 
cases made up 28 per cent of the Court’s docket in 2007 (16 of the 58 
decisions), which is consistent with recent trends. The majority of the 
constitutional cases (12 of 16 cases) were Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms cases,4 while the remaining four cases dealt with 
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1
  A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the 
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
  Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 1997-
2007, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/index_e.asp> [hereinafter 
“Statistics”]. 
3
  The Supreme Court of Canada gained significant control over its docket in 1975 through 
amendments requiring the Court to grant leave to appeal for most civil cases. 
4
  Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Baier”]; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
873 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald 
Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “JTI-Macdonald”]; 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]; Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. 
Health Services”]; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs and 
Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters No. 2”]; 
Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
4 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
federalism issues.5 No cases during calendar 2007 addressed Aboriginal 
constitutional issues.6  
The 2007 term revealed a Court that was more divided and took 
more time to release lengthier decisions. Just 63 per cent of judgments 
were unanimous in 2007, the lowest since the mid-1990s and a departure 
from the McLachlin Court’s overall average of 75 per cent. A greater 
number of dissents together with multiple concurring reasons led to 
longer judgments — an average of 44.8 pages per appeal, the highest in 
the past 20 years. The time from hearing a case to releasing a decision 
also increased to an average of 6.6 months, compared to a mean of 5.3 
months since 2000.  
II. CHARTER CASES 
The Court was not particularly receptive to Charter claims in 2007, 
with only three of 12 cases (25 per cent) succeeding.7 This is somewhat 
of a decline from the average success rate in the recent past; since 
McLachlin J. was elevated to Chief Justice on January 7, 2000, Charter 
claimants have succeeded in 50 out of 114 cases (44 per cent) at the 
Supreme Court. However, the results from 2007 are not a significant 
departure from longer-term trends, as approximately one out of every 
three Charter claims has been successful at the Supreme Court over the 
past two decades.8  
While the number of successful Charter cases in 2007 was low, the 
three cases in which the claimants did succeed (Charkaoui, B.C. Health 
                                                                                                             
“Named Person”]; R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Bryan”]; R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”]; 
R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]; R. v. Singh, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]; Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5
  British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”]; Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; Dunne v. Quebec 
(Deputy Minister of Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 19, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 853 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dunne”]; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kingstreet”]. 
6
  While the Court did release decisions dealing with Aboriginal rights issues in 2007, none 
of them addressed the interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution of Canada. 
7
  A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of 
relief under s. 24 of the Charter, or where a statute or other legal rule is declared to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
8
  See Patrick J. Monahan & Evan Van Dyk, “Constitutional Cases 2004: An Overview” 
(2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 2. 
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Services and Hislop) set what may prove to be important precedents. In 
particular, the Hislop case develops a new framework for determining 
whether Charter remedies should be granted on a retroactive basis, a 
framework that will likely prove difficult to apply and may generate 
uncertainty for both claimants and governments. (Both Charkaoui, 
dealing with the constitutional validity of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act security certificate regime, and B.C. Health Services, in 
which the Court ruled that Canadians have a constitutional right to 
engage in collective bargaining, are addressed in detail elsewhere in this 
volume and, accordingly, will not be dealt with here.)  
Equally important were the 2007 cases in which Charter claims were 
unsuccessful. There were a total of five appeals dealing with freedom of 
expression claims under section 2(b), as well as two significant cases 
dealing with police powers. Another important theme that emerges from 
the 2007 term is an evident concern on the part of the majority of the 
Court with the potential cost implications flowing from the recognition 
of Charter claims. These developments are explored in some detail below. 
1. Charter Remedies — Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop 
Hislop arose from a class action lawsuit challenging the federal 
government’s July 2000 amendments to the Canada Pension Plan 
(“CPP”)9 as a violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. The amending 
legislation, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
(“MBOA”),10 had been enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in M. v. H.11 striking down the opposite sex definition of “spouse” 
in Ontario’s Family Law Act. The MBOA made same-sex partners 
eligible for survivor’s benefits under the Plan; however, it also added 
two new subsections that restricted the date on which same-sex survivors 
became entitled to benefits. Section 44(1.1) limited CPP eligibility to 
same-sex survivors whose contributing partner had died after January 1, 
1998, while section 72(2) allowed no payments to same-sex survivors 
for any month before July 2000 (when same-sex survivors first became 
eligible under the CPP to apply for survivor’s benefits). 
                                                                                                             
9
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. 
10
  S.C. 2000, c. 12. The MBOA was an omnibus statute that amended 68 pieces of federal 
legislation to comply with the Court’s ruling in M. v. H., infra, note 11. 
11
  [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), holding that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the definition of common law spouse under Ontario’s Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. F.3 violated s. 15 and could not be justified under s. 1.  
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A class action was brought by a group of same-sex survivors (the 
“Hislop class”) challenging sections 44(1.1) and 72(2) of the CPP as a 
violation of their equality rights. The class made two other constitutional 
claims. They asserted that the application of the general rule of section 
72(1), which restricts all retroactive benefit claims (from both same-sex 
and opposite-sex survivors) to 12 months from the date of application 
had an adverse effect on same-sex survivors as they had been unable to 
apply for benefits before July 2000. They also challenged the application 
of section 60(2), which required the estates of survivors of same-sex 
relationships to submit claims to benefits within 12 months of the death 
of the survivor.  
The Court ruled 7-0 that the limitations prescribed by sections 
44(1.1) and 72(2) of the CPP violated section 15(1) of the Charter and 
could not be upheld under section 1. Its reasoning on these issues was 
fairly straightforward and did not break any significant new ground. 
With respect to the limitation in section 44(1.1) (which provided that 
only those claimants whose contributing partners had died after January 
1, 1998 were eligible for benefits), the only difficult legal issue was the 
correct choice of comparator group. The Attorney General of Canada 
had argued that the legislation did not distinguish between same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples but, rather, between two groups of same-sex 
couples: those where the contributing partner died prior to, as opposed to 
later than, January 1, 1998. The Supreme Court rightly rejected this 
argument, holding that what must be compared is the subset of same-sex 
survivors who remain excluded from CPP survivors’ benefits, along with 
similarly situated opposite-sex survivors. This meant that the appropriate 
comparator group consisted of opposite-sex survivors whose contributing 
partner had died prior to January 1998. Having made this determination, 
the Court concluded that excluding same-sex survivors whose partners 
had died prior to January 1998 from applying for CPP benefits violated 
the Court’s established tests under section 15 and could not be justified 
under section 1. 
With respect to section 72(2), which precluded claims for same-sex 
benefits for periods prior to July 2000, the Court noted that there were 
general provisions elsewhere in the legislation limiting claims for 
retroactive benefits to 12 months from the date of application. This 
general limitation provided an answer to concerns about the potential 
costs associated with claims for same-sex survivors’ benefits reaching 
extensively into the past. The Court therefore was unable to discern a 
compelling justification for precluding entirely any benefits claims for 
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periods prior to July 2000. The effect of eliminating section 72(2) was 
that it would be possible for same-sex survivors to claim pension arrears 
from as early as August 1999 (i.e., 12 months prior to the coming into 
force of the MBOA.) 
The real significance of Hislop came in its analysis of section 72(1), 
the general provision limiting claims for retroactive CPP benefits to a 
maximum of 12 months. The claimants were not seeking a declaration 
that this provision was invalid in its entirety. Rather, they sought a 
constitutional exemption from the limitation on arrears, so that same-sex 
survivors would be able to claim arrears for the period between 1985 and 
2000.  
The majority reasons of LeBel and Rothstein JJ. (concurred in by 
four others), noted that declarations of invalidity often have retroactive 
effect. This is because an invalid law is generally invalid from the outset, 
meaning that any prior government actions or decisions taken on the 
basis of such a law will also be invalid. This is a straightforward 
application of principles associated with the rule of law, which holds that 
government actions require proper legal authorization to have binding 
effect.  
So far so good. But the majority opinion of LeBel and Rothstein JJ. 
moves on to more questionable ground by suggesting that the retroactive 
effect of a constitutional declaration of invalidity arises from the 18th-
century writings of jurist William Blackstone, rather than principles 
associated with the rule of law. According to LeBel and Rothstein JJ., 
constitutional remedies have retroactive effect because of Blackstone’s 
“declaratory approach”, which holds that judges do not create law but 
merely discover it. Because judges merely “rediscover rules which are 
deemed to have always existed”12 it is appropriate to grant retroactive 
effect to declarations of invalidity. This leads the majority opinion to the 
further conclusion that, where courts operate “outside of the Blackstonian 
paradigm” (when “judges are fashioning new legal rules or principles 
and not when they are applying existing law”),13 then it may be 
appropriate for the court to issue a prospective rather than a retroactive 
remedy.  
The difficulty with this remedial framework is that it depends on a 
questionable distinction between cases in which courts are merely 
“discovering” law, as opposed to those in which courts are creating new 
                                                                                                             
12
  Hislop, supra, note 4, at para. 84, per LeBel and Rothstein JJ. 
13
  Id., at para. 86. 
8 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
law. Virtually all cases that reach the Supreme Court of Canada involve 
some significant creative legal element. Thus it would appear extremely 
difficult and problematic to distinguish between cases in which courts 
are merely “declaring the law as it existed” as opposed to those in which 
it is “developing new law”. The majority opinion seems to acknowledge 
this difficulty, by suggesting that prospective (as opposed to retroactive) 
remedies will be appropriate in cases involving a “substantial change in 
the law”.14 Moreover, even where there has been a “substantial change in 
the law”, LeBel and Rothstein JJ. suggest that it is necessary to take into 
account a range of other contextual factors and considerations, including 
whether there has been reasonable or good faith reliance by government, 
fairness to litigants and whether a retroactive remedy would unduly 
interfere with the allocation of scarce public resources by governments.15 
However, in cases involving the collection of taxes based on 
unconstitutional statutes, the funds must be returned retroactively, 
regardless of whether there has been a substantial change in the law.16  
In Hislop, the majority held that while the “substantial change in the 
law” test was met, the contextual factors weighed against a retroactive 
remedy. The majority viewed the Hislop class’s arguments as a claim for 
compensatory damages flowing from the underinclusiveness of the CPP 
and, in the absence of bad faith, unreasonable reliance by government, or 
conduct that was clearly wrong, such a remedy was inappropriate. Given 
that the remedy the class was seeking was unavailable, LeBel and 
Rothstein JJ. found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of 
section 72(1). 
The concurring opinion of Bastarache J. reaches the same result but 
by a much more direct and simple route. Justice Bastarache points out 
that the basis for the general retroactivity of constitutional remedies is 
not the Blackstonian declaratory theory but the Constitution itself: any 
law that is inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada is invalid from 
the outset, and government decisions taken in reliance on invalid 
legislation have no legal foundation. However, Bastarache J. goes on to 
suggest that there may be cases where countervailing considerations 
argue against the normal rule that constitutional remedies operate 
retrospectively as well as prospectively. This was precisely such a case, 
since the effect of ordering the payment of CPP benefits retroactively to 
                                                                                                             
14
  Id., at para. 99. 
15
  Id., at para. 100. 
16
  Id., at para. 108. 
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1985, with interest, would have involved significant disruption to public 
finances while conferring a huge windfall on a limited number of 
beneficiaries. In the result, Bastarache J. agreed with the majority that 
the remedy should be prospective only in this case. 
The majority opinion of LeBel and Rothstein JJ., holding that the 
courts do commonly make substantial changes in the law, is an 
unusually candid acknowledgement of the creative role of courts in 
Charter adjudication. Unfortunately, it appears to have complicated, 
rather than simplified, the issue of when retroactive Charter relief is 
appropriate. The “substantial change in the law” test will likely prove to 
be difficult to apply in practice, and will likely result in more litigation 
to establish exactly what qualifies as a significant change in the law. 
Justice Bastarache’s analysis demonstrates that it is possible to arrive at 
the same result, using substantially the same criteria as the majority, 
without engaging in an inquiry of whether a recent legal decision has 
involved a “significant” break with the past. It remains to be seen 
whether the remedial framework articulated by the majority in Hislop is 
widely applied in future cases.  
2. Freedom of Expression 
The Court heard five cases related to section 2(b) freedom of 
expression claims in 2007, all of which were unsuccessful.17 The Court’s 
established approach to freedom of expression claims is to give a broad 
definition to the right, and to consider any limitations on free expression 
through balancing under section 1. The 2007 section 2(b) decisions 
revealed a slight departure from that approach, and a greater willingness 
to dispose of free expression claims on the basis of a categorical test 
rather than balancing.  
                                                                                                             
17
  Baier, supra, note 4: an Alberta law requiring teachers running for school board trustee 
positions to take a leave of absence does not violate s. 2(b); JTI-Macdonald, supra, note 4: the 
government’s restrictions on tobacco advertising, contained in the Tobacco Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13 and 
Tobacco Products Information Regulations, SOR/2000-272 violated s. 2(b) but were saved under s. 
1; Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4: advanced cost awards for continuing litigation will be granted 
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where the case is sufficiently important that denying the 
application would be “contrary to the interests of justice”; Named Person, supra, note 4: the right 
that police informers have to protection of their identities in court trumps free expression claims; 
Bryan, supra, note 4: sections of the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 prohibiting the 
transmission of election results from one riding into a riding with open polling stations are 
constitutional.  
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For example in Named Person, during an in camera portion of an 
extradition hearing the person who was the subject of the proceeding 
notified the judge that he was a confidential police informer. The court 
appointed an amicus curiae and heard submissions as to whether the 
extradition proceedings should continue in camera. The court eventually 
invited a number of media representatives to make submissions as to 
whether the “open court” principle, protected by section 2(b), took 
precedence over the protection of the identity of police informers. Justice 
Bastarache, writing for eight members of the Court, found that the 
informer privilege must remain absolute, and therefore any information 
that can be used to identify an informant cannot be revealed, “except 
where the innocence of a criminal accused is at stake”.18 A court has no 
discretion in deciding whether to apply the rule; Bastarache J. noted that 
“the duty of a court not to breach the privilege is of the same nature as 
the duty of the police or the Crown”.19 There was therefore no need to 
balance the protection for police informers with the “open court” 
principle.  
Similarly, in Baier the Court considered a requirement that school 
employees seeking election as school trustees take an unpaid leave of 
absence in order to run for office, and resign if elected. This requirement 
was challenged on the basis that it limited the employees’ claims to 
expressive freedom.20 Eight members of the Court, in two separate 
concurring opinions, found that there was no violation of section 2(b) 
and therefore no need to consider section 1. The majority opinion of 
Rothstein J. relied on the fact that the claimants were seeking a positive 
rather than a negative right; in this case, they sought access to the 
statutory platform of school trustee candidacy and school trusteeship. 
Justice Rothstein held that this claim failed to satisfy the Dunmore 
criteria as to the limited circumstances in which a positive right could 
quality for Charter protection.21 Justice LeBel, on behalf of two others, 
                                                                                                             
18
  Named Person, supra, note 4, at para. 4. 
19
  Id., at para. 21. 
20
  The limitation was also challenged on the basis of a violation of s. 15(1), but this claim 
was dismissed on the basis that the distinction drawn by the legislation did not involve a ground that 
was “enumerated or analogous” to the grounds identified in s. 15. 
21
  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at 
paras. 24-26 (S.C.C.). In Dunmore the Court had held that in cases where it is alleged that a 
statutory regime is underinclusive, the claim must be grounded in “fundamental Charter freedoms 
rather than in access to a particular statutory regime”; the claimant must also show that exclusion 
from the regime has the effect of substantial interference with an activity protected under s. 2(b); 
finally, the purpose of the exclusion must not be to interfere with freedom of expression, but must 
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held that the claim concerned a democratic right (to run for school board 
trustee) that the Charter did not protect, meaning section 2(b) was 
inapplicable to the case. In the rest, by an 8-1 margin, the Court did not 
find it necessary to proceed to a consideration of section 1 of the 
Charter. (Justice Fish dissented, arguing that excluding a group of 
qualified persons from serving on democratically elected boards violated 
section 2(b) and could not be justified under section 1.)  
Finally, in Little Sisters No. 2, the Court by a 7-2 majority held that 
orders for advance costs should be made only in “rare and exceptional” 
cases. Vancouver’s Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium has fought a 
series of protracted legal battles with Canada Customs over the agency’s 
detention of ostensibly obscene materials at the border. Despite the 
owners’ partial success before the Supreme Court in Little Sisters No. 1,22 
Customs has continued to detain materials destined for the store. Little 
Sisters challenged Customs’ classification of four titles as obscene in the 
B.C. Supreme Court. During the litigation at the trial level, the store 
owners brought an application for an advance costs award, claiming they 
could not afford to continue the case. The trial judge granted the 
application, and Customs appealed the order. The B.C. Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal, setting aside the costs award. Little Sisters appealed 
to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.  
The main majority opinion of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. noted that 
public interest advance costs orders should be approached with great 
caution and only granted as a last resort where their necessity is clearly 
established. The concurring opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. 
appeared to set the bar even higher, holding that an order for advance 
costs should be made only in “special circumstances making this 
extraordinary exercise of the court’s power appropriate”.23 The two 
majority opinions narrowed the scope of the Court’s earlier holding in 
Okanagan, where advance costs had been awarded to four Indian bands 
involved in a logging dispute with the British Columbia government.24 
The Court described Okanagan as a case where there was “an exceptional 
convergence of factors” justifying an advance costs order, and emphasized 
                                                                                                             
be in furtherance of some other legitimate objective. Justice Rothstein held that none of these three 
criteria was satisfied in this instance. 
22
  Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 
66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.). 
23
  Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4, at para. 88. 
24
  British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76, 
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.). 
12 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
that the case involved an “evolutionary step, but not a revolution, in the 
exercise of the courts’ discretion regarding costs”.25  
3. Other Charter Cases 
The categorical approach favoured in a number of the Court’s 
freedom of expression claims was evident in other cases in the 2007 
term as well, notably Hape. In Hape, the RCMP had commenced an 
investigation into suspected money laundering activities by a Canadian 
businessman, who was later charged with money laundering. They 
obtained permission from the Turks and Caicos Islands authorities to 
conduct part of the investigation on the Islands, where the accused had 
an investment company. During the investigation the RCMP conducted a 
number of searches (some without warrants) of the accused’s offices on 
the Islands.26 The accused sought to have the documentary evidence 
obtained excluded on the basis that it had been obtained in violation of 
his rights under section 8 of the Charter. 
The Court ruled 9-0 (but with three sets of reasons) that there was no 
Charter violation in this case. For a five-member majority, LeBel J. 
concluded that the Charter does not apply to Canadian officials operating 
in another jurisdiction, with very rare exceptions.27 Where there is an 
attempt to adduce evidence at a Canadian trial obtained through a 
foreign search, the court should base its decision on the need to ensure 
the fairness of a trial. This requirement follows from the Charter 
provisions guaranteeing trial fairness in Canada (sections 7 and 11(d)) 
and does not involve the extraterritorial application of the Charter. In 
this case, LeBel J. concluded that the Charter did not apply to the 
searches themselves; moreover, in his view admitting the evidence 
obtained during the searches would not result in an unfair trial and 
therefore there was no violation of section 7 or section 11(d). Justice 
Bastarache, for two other justices, held that the Charter could apply 
                                                                                                             
25
  Little Sisters No. 2, supra, note 4, at para. 34. 
26
  While no warrants were admitted into evidence during the trial (and none had been 
secured for the perimeter surveillance of Hape’s office), the RCMP officers testified that they had 
relied on the expertise of the detective in charge of criminal investigations on the Islands, and had 
understood that warrants had been obtained for several covert searches performed at the office. See 
Hape, supra, note 4. 
27
  One exception would be if the foreign state consented to the application of Canadian law, 
including the Charter, on its territory (id., at para. 106); a second exception would arise if the 
activity by Canadian state actors would place Canada in violation of its international human rights 
obligations (id., at para. 101). 
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extraterritorially, but agreed with the disposition in this case on the basis 
that Hape had not established that the search was unreasonable, in light 
of the local laws which governed searches of accused premises. In 
Bastarache J.’s opinion, therefore, section 8 of the Charter applied to the 
searches but had not been breached. Justice Binnie wrote a brief set of 
reasons concurring in the result but disassociating himself from what he 
described as LeBel J.’s “[c]onstitutional pronouncements of such far-
reaching implications”,28 and arguing that this case did not afford “a 
proper springboard for such sweeping conclusions”.29  
The potential implications of Hape were made apparent just months 
later in the Amnesty International Canada case, in which the Federal 
Court held that the Charter did not apply to military transfers by 
Canadian authorities of Afghan detainees.30 On this basis, Mactavish J. 
dismissed an application for judicial review of the transfers. Yet in May 
of 2008, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Khadr that one of the 
exceptions identified in Hape applied to interrogations being conducted 
by Canadian officials at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.31 In particular the Court relied on the fact that the process in place 
at Guantanamo Bay had been found by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
violate U.S. domestic law and international human rights obligations to 
which Canada subscribes. Therefore the normal rule to the effect that the 
Charter did not apply to activities on foreign soil was inapplicable, and 
Omar Khadr was entitled to disclosure of documents in possession of the 
Canadian government relevant to charges he was facing under U.S. law.  
What was unusual about Khadr was that there had been a prior 
ruling by the highest domestic court in the jurisdiction (here the U.S. 
Supreme Court), based on a full factual record, that the activities in 
question violated international law. In the absence of such a prior ruling 
(which will most often be the case), to what extent will the courts require 
a separate proceeding to consider the application of international human 
rights law, before ruling on whether the Charter applies to activities in a 
                                                                                                             
28
  Id., at para. 189. 
29
  Id., at para. 182. Justice Binnie noted that the so-called “war on terror” involved 
considerable activity by Canadian government or military officials on foreign soil. In his view it was 
preferable to have a proper factual record and complete legal argument on whether the Charter 
should apply in such circumstances.  
30
  Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces), [2008] F.C.J. No. 356, 
2008 FC 336 (F.C.). Interestingly, Binnie J. in his dissent in Hape had referenced the litigation on 
this issue, and indicated that the Supreme Court should not foreclose the potential application of the 
Charter to this activity. See Hape, supra, note 4, at para. 184. 
31
  Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 29, 2008 SCC 29 (S.C.C.). 
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foreign jurisdiction? If such separate proceedings are commonly entertained, 
this would clearly limit the application of Hape, which seemed to create 
a categorical rule against the extraterritorial application of the Charter.  
The Court handed down two significant cases dealing with police 
powers in 2007, both of which sided with law enforcement. The first of 
these, R. v. Clayton, raised the question of whether a roadside stop and 
detention violated section 8 or section 9 of the Charter. Police officers, 
responding to an early-morning 911 call warning that individuals in a 
number of vehicles were displaying handguns, had stopped a vehicle and 
detained the occupants. The Ontario Court of Appeal had quashed the 
trial convictions in the case, holding that the roadblock was unlawful 
because there was no imminent danger, and the vehicle that was stopped 
was not one of the vehicles that had been identified in the 911 call that 
brought police to the scene. Justice Abella, for a six-member majority, 
restored the convictions, finding that there was no violation of section 8 
or section 9 of the Charter and, therefore, no need to consider the 
application of section 24 or section 1. Justice Abella reasoned that in 
assessing whether searches incident to an investigative detention violated 
the Charter, it was necessary to consider whether the stop and search 
were no more intrusive than reasonably necessary. In particular, searches 
can be justified if an officer believes reasonably that his or her safety, or 
that of others, is at risk. Here the police had reasonable grounds to 
believe that there were several handguns in a public place. This 
represented a serious offence accompanied by genuine risk to the public, 
and justified a search of the vehicle in question even though it had not 
been described in the 911 call.  
The Court was more closely divided in Singh, one of only two 
constitutional cases to be decided by a 5-4 majority in 2007.32 The 
accused was arrested for second degree murder in respect of the shooting 
death of an innocent bystander who was killed by a stray bullet while 
standing just inside the doorway of a pub. Singh was advised of his right 
to counsel and stated 18 times during the course of interviews that he did 
not want to talk to police. Nevertheless the police continued their 
questioning. Although he did not confess to the crime, he made a 
number of admissions which, when taken together with other evidence, 
were probative of the issue of identification. Singh challenged the 
admissibility of the statements on the basis of a violation of his right to 
silence under section 7. Justice Charron, writing for a five-person 
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majority of the Court, found that there was no “rigid requirement” that 
police refrain from questioning a detainee who states that he or she does 
not wish to speak to police. To impose a general prohibition of this kind 
would ignore the state interest in the effective investigation of crime. 
Justice Charron emphasized that the fundamental question remained 
whether the statement was made voluntarily. While persistence in 
continuing an interview in the face of protestations from the accused that 
he wished to remain silent might give rise to a “strong argument” that 
the statement was not made voluntarily, the trial judge in this case found 
Singh’s statement to have been made freely and there was no basis to 
interfere with that finding.  
Justice Fish authored a vigorous dissent on behalf of four members 
of the Court, arguing that intense questioning over suspects’ protests 
deprived them of their right to silence. According to the dissenters, in a 
situation such as the one in which Singh found himself, where his 
continued resistance to questioning appeared useless, “ultimate 
submission proves neither true consent nor valid waiver”.33 Justice Fish 
would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.  
Significantly, both Clayton and Singh arose from criminal activity 
involving guns or gun crime. There is widespread public concern in 
Canada over the extent of gun crime, particularly in major urban centres 
such as Toronto.34 The majority opinions in both Clayton and Singh seem 
particularly sensitive to the need to ensure that the application of the 
Charter not unduly impede the ability of the police to investigate and 
prosecute gun crime.  
The justices also demonstrated a good deal of sensitivity to the cost 
implications of their Charter rulings this past year. In Hislop, the Court 
indicated that it would be appropriate, in determining whether to make a 
Charter remedy retroactive, to consider the cost implications of such an 
order. Similarly, in Christie, a lawyer challenged the constitutionality of 
British Columbia’s legal service tax, arguing that the tax made it 
impossible for some of his low-income clients to afford his services. 
Christie argued the tax violated a constitutional right of access to justice 
that was based on the principle of the rule of law. In a per curiam 
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  Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 66. 
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  See, for example, John Barber, “Urbanites’ call for ban on guns hits deaf ears in Ottawa” 
The Globe and Mail, April 10, 2008, at A13 (reporting on the 16,000 residents who signed Toronto 
Mayor David Miller’s Internet petition to ban handguns in only four days); Lee Greenberg, “Murder 
rate growing in infamy” Leader Post, December 27, 2007, at D8 (reporting on the after-effects of 
Toronto’s 2005 “Year of the Gun”). 
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opinion, the Court disagreed, holding there was no general right to be 
represented by a lawyer in a court proceeding where legal rights or 
obligations are at stake. The justices held that “the fiscal implications of 
the right sought cannot be denied. … It is a huge change that would … 
impose a not inconsiderable burden on taxpayers”.35  
III. FEDERALISM CASES 
The Court shifted its interpretation of the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine, and clarified its approach to issues of federal 
paramountcy, in a pair of important federalism cases. In both Canadian 
Western Bank36 and Lafarge,37 released concurrently, the Court 
significantly narrowed the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, which 
limits the extent to which laws enacted by one level of government can 
affect matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other. The 
leading case on the scope of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine 
had been Beetz J.’s opinion in Bell Canada (1988),38 which had held that 
provincial laws could not affect “integral and vital parts” of federally 
regulated undertakings, such as those in fields of interprovincial 
transportation or communication. The majority opinion of Binnie and 
LeBel JJ., writing for six members of the Court, held that Beetz J.’s 
approach in Bell Canada (1988) gave too broad a scope to the 
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. Echoing sentiments expressed by 
former Chief Justice Dickson,39 Justices Binnie and LeBel argued that 
this broad application of the doctrine was counter to the “dominant tide 
of constitutional interpretation” favouring the ordinary operation of 
statutes enacted by both levels of government; moreover, it “runs the 
risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in constitutional 
interpretation”.40 They proceeded to expound a more restrictive approach 
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  Christie, supra, note 4, at para. 14. 
36
  Supra, note 5: Alberta amended its Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3 in 2000 to apply a 
licensing scheme to banks that were selling insurance in the province. A number of banks 
challenged the law, arguing that according to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity it must be 
read down so as to not apply to federally regulated banks. The challenge was unsuccessful. 
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  Supra, note 5. 
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  Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell Canada (1988)”]. 
39
  See, in particular, Dickson C.J.C.’s opinion in OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 17 (S.C.C.). 
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  Canadian Western Bank, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 37 and 45 
(S.C.C.).  
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to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, reverting back to the law 
as it stood prior to Bell Canada (1988). First, they suggested that the 
doctrine was of limited application and should generally be reserved for 
situations already covered by precedent.41 In practical terms, this meant 
that the doctrine would generally be applied only in respect of federal 
undertakings or entities that had previously been held to fall within its 
scope. In cases not covered by prior precedent, Binnie and LeBel JJ. 
suggested that federal undertakings would only be immune from 
provincial laws which “impair” (as opposed to merely “affect”) their 
operations; in addition, only activities that were vital or essential to the 
“basic, minimum and unassailable” content of the federal head of power 
would be immune from provincial regulation. Applying this restrictive 
doctrine to the facts in Canadian Western Bank, the majority held that 
the business of selling insurance was not a vital or essential part of 
banking and, therefore, banks that sold insurance as part of their business 
were subject to provincial insurance regulation as well as federal 
regulation under the Bank Act.42  
Canadian Western Bank also provides important clarification 
respecting the scope of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. As is well 
known, in cases where there is an inconsistency between valid and 
applicable federal and provincial laws, the provincial law is rendered 
inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. The key challenge has 
been to define the circumstances in which there is a “conflict” between 
federal and provincial legislation. Earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence 
had tended to define situations of conflict quite narrowly, arising only in 
cases of a direct contradiction between federal and provincial laws. The 
classic case would be “where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other 
says ‘no’”, such that compliance with one law would involve defiance of 
the other.43 A number of more recent decisions had appeared to suggest a 
somewhat broader interpretation of legislative conflict, as arising where 
the operation of a provincial law might “frustrate the purpose” of a 
federal enactment.44 In Canadian Western Bank, the majority opinion 
clarified that in these more recent cases the Court did not intend to 
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  Id., at para. 77. 
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  S.C. 1991, c. 46. 
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  Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at 191 
(S.C.C.). 
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  See, in particular, Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 
(S.C.C.); Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 
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“reverse its previous decisions and adopt the ‘occupied field’ test it had 
clearly rejected … ”.45 Moreover, the onus of establishing the existence 
of a conflict lies on the party seeking to rely on the doctrine of federal 
paramountcy. Applying this framework to the legislation before it, the 
Court found that there was no incompatibility between the relevant 
provisions of the Bank Act and applicable provincial insurance regulation.  
A similar approach was adopted in relation to the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Lafarge. Lafarge 
Canada Inc. wished to build a concrete production plant on port lands 
owned by the Vancouver Port Authority (“VPA”), a federally regulated 
undertaking constituted pursuant to the Canada Marine Act.46 VPA 
approved the facility, which violated certain zoning requirements of the 
City of Vancouver. The City took the position that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the lands because they were subject to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, but a group of ratepayers filed suit in B.C. Supreme Court 
arguing the City had incorrectly declined to exercise jurisdiction. The 
ratepayers’ application was allowed, but was overturned by the B.C. 
Court of Appeal. At the Supreme Court of Canada, Binnie and LeBel JJ., 
writing for the same six-member majority that decided Canadian 
Western Bank, held that the lands were not immune from provincial or 
municipal regulation. They relied on the fact that the lands were owned 
by the VPA which, although a federal undertaking, was not a federal 
Crown agent in relation to the lands in question. Moreover, the lessee of 
the lands, Lafarge Inc., was not a federal undertaking and the activities 
that were to take place on the land (cement mixing) did not fall within 
VPA’s core or vital functions, nor were they inextricably bound up with 
navigation and shipping. Thus there was no basis to invoke the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity and provincial land use controls could 
apply.  
However, Binnie and LeBel JJ. went on to conclude that there was 
an operational conflict between applicable federal and provincial 
regulation and therefore the provincial regulation was rendered 
inoperative by virtue of the conflict. The operational conflict arose by 
virtue of differing standards with respect to height restrictions and noise 
and pollution standards. Therefore the City’s zoning and development 
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by-law was constitutionally inapplicable to the project by virtue of 
Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over “navigation and shipping”.47  
Justice Bastarache concurred with his colleagues’ disposition of both 
cases, but disagreed with their approach to the interjurisdictional 
immunity doctrine. He defended the doctrine as “an essential legal test” 
necessary in any constitutional challenge to legislation, holding that the 
proper analytical pattern should always involve a consideration of the 
validity, applicability and then operability of the challenged legislation. 
Without the doctrine, Bastarache J. argued, there is no way for a court to 
read down a provincial law that is inapplicable to a federal matter while 
still preserving the applicability of the law to “non-federal” matters. 
IV. VOTING PATTERNS 
In 2007, the justices were only unanimous in 63 per cent of the 
constitutional cases they heard. This statistic masks the fact that the 
Court was significantly more divided on Charter issues (only unanimous 
in six of 12 cases) than it was in federalism cases; all four federalism 
decisions in 2007 were unanimous in the result. In divided Charter cases, 
McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ. 
tended to be in the majority. In the 12 Charter cases decided by the 
Court, Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein JJ. had no dissents, while the 
Chief Justice and Deschamps J. had one dissent each. Justices Binnie, 
LeBel and Fish each had three dissents, while Abella J. dissented twice. 
In all cases except Deschamps J.’s opinion in B.C. Health Services, the 
dissent was in favour of the Charter claimant.  
V. CONCLUSION — A STUDY IN CONTRASTS 
The most striking feature of the 2007 term may prove to be how 
much of a departure it represented from recent experience at the 
Supreme Court. For example, in 2004 and 2005, the Court decided an 
average of 84 appeals per year, compared to 58 in 2007. The justices 
were unanimous in 73 per cent of cases in those earlier two years, 
compared to 63 per cent in the past year, while the average time from 
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hearing an appeal to releasing a judgment has gone from 4.6 months to 
6.6 months.  
The equilibrium that existed as recently as two years ago appears to 
have eroded somewhat. As Bastarache J. unexpectedly announced his 
retirement in April 2008, his replacement could play a pivotal role in the 
Court’s future jurisprudence. It will also be an interesting opportunity to 
see how the Conservative government will shape the procedure for 
nominating justices to the Supreme Court. On May 28, 2008, the 
Minister of Justice announced the details of the process,48 which will 
continue the trend towards openness and transparency begun with the 
nomination of Abella and Charron JJ. and continued with that of Rothstein 
J.49 Under the new process, the Minister will develop a list of qualified 
candidates, through consultations with the attorneys general of the four 
Atlantic provinces,50 as well as members of the legal community. The 
Department of Justice has also set up a website and email address for 
members of the public to provide input on potential candidates. The list 
of candidates will be given to a panel composed of five Members of 
Parliament — two members from the Conservative caucus, and one from 
each of the opposition caucuses, selected by each party leader. The so-
called Supreme Court Selection Panel will be required to assess the 
candidates and provide an unranked list of three qualified candidates to 
the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice. The Prime Minister and the 
Minister will select from that list and the nominee will appear at a public 
hearing before an ad hoc committee of Parliament, similar to the 
committee Rothstein J. appeared at in 2006.51  
Critics of the committee process that led to the appointment of 
Rothstein J. suggested that it would lead to the politicization of the 
judiciary and predicted U.S.-style confirmation battles.52 This did not 
come to pass. However, Rothstein J. was selected by the Conservatives 
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  An outline of the process is available at the Department of Justice website, 
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2006, at A18. 
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from a shortlist developed under Paul Martin’s Liberal minority 
government, which may have muted any potential opposition to 
Rothstein J.’s appointment from the ad hoc committee or the Liberal 
caucus. Moreover, the advisory committee that developed the shortlist 
that led to Rothstein J.’s appointment included non-partisan members, 
such as a retired judge, nominees of provincial law societies and 
individuals who were neither judges nor lawyers. Provision was also 
made for nominees of provincial attorneys general. Under the new 
process, the panel selecting the shortlist is composed of five Members of 
Parliament, two of whom are members of the governing Conservative 
caucus.  
Reducing the size of the advisory panel and eliminating the non-
partisan representatives and the nominees of the provincial attorneys 
general appears unwise and entails the risk that the advisory panel will 
operate in a partisan fashion. Such partisanship could then spill over into 
the public hearing, which could taint both the nominee and the entire 
nomination process. In our view, it would have been preferable to retain 
the structure of the earlier advisory committee, which combined partisan 
and non-partisan membership. Nevertheless, one positive element is that 
the government members have a minority on the advisory panel, which 
may induce the panel to operate in a consensual fashion. If a future 
majority government chooses to use a similar advisory panel, it should 
retain this arrangement. It is to be hoped that the government will 
carefully monitor the impact of the additional changes it has introduced 
in the current appointment process, and recognize that it may be 
necessary to make further adjustments in the future in order to ensure 
that the merit principle remains the dominant consideration in terms of 
appointments to our highest court.  
 
 
